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Table 1: Impact Investment Assets and amount of assets (Bragg, 2011) 
Impact investments assets by category Assets ($ million) 
Aboriginal Funds 285.7 
Community Futures Development Corporations 910.6 
Community Loan Funds and Social Venture Capital 348.8 
Credit Unions 951.5 
Foundations 32.0 
International Impact Investments 5.6 
Quebec – Development Capital 1,049.1 
Quebec – Solidarity Finance 850.5 
Total 4,447.8 
Strandberg narrows her study to nine foundations in Canada engaged in impact investing. Col-
lectively Canadian community and private foundations control $17-20 billion in assets, although 
a very small portion f this is engaged in impact investment. Her findi gs are that few founda-
tions have formal policies on mission-related investments, although some have set caps includ-
ing one that prohibits more than $1 million in assets going to mission-related investment and 
other that limit total assets that can be committed to impact investing ranging from 5-40%. Of 
the foundations she studied, altogether there were 50 mission-related investments with the 
majority under $100,000 and few over $1 million, though overall those made up a substantial 
component of the mission-related investment portfolio as these included a $1 million, a $2 mil-
lion and a $10 million investment. About half of the investment products the foundations used 
were loans or mortgages at market rates, followed by below market rate loans and equity at 
about 10% each (Strandberg, 2010).  
One element that does come through clearly in the research is that although there are both a 
substantial supply of and demand f r social financing, a major barrier is the lack of well-
developed social finance intermediaries. Godeke and Pomares (2009) identify two types of 
models financial advisors follow in their relationship with impact investment providers: on in 
which the financial advisor is also the impact investor, and another in which a specialist pro-
vides the impact analysis which must then be coordinated with the models used by more tradi-
tional financial advisors. They also suggest a few specific barriers to the efficient delivery if im-
pact investment advisory services: the necessity of having active ownership although there are 
often multiple layers of intermediaries, a disconnect between long-term impact investment ob-
jectives and the short-term time horizon of specialist consultants, a lack of consensus on how to 
define and measure social impact, advisors’ tendency to focus on a select asset class rather 
than providing services across asset classes, lack of research and due diligence infrastructure, 
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Quantitative Results of the Survey 
We will present descriptive statistics and significance tests (analyses of variance (ANOVA) and 
Chi2 tests) to analyse t e data, follo ed by the analysis of the qualitativ  responses. 
The type of organization that responded the questionnaire was diverse. Twenty four of them 
were Community Futures Development Corporations or Community Business Development 
Corporati ns. In this report we will call this roup Community Development Orga izations 
(CDC) . Three of them were community loan funds, private investment funds, service providers 
or consultancies, and public funders respectively. Furthermore two credit unions, two coopera-
tives, two investment managers, and two loan funds participated. In addition, one insurance 
cooperative, one private foundation, one carbon fund manager, one non-profit organization 
and one private funder responded to the survey (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Types of organizations responding to the survey 
Thus it seems that the group of non-profit and social enterprise financiers is very heterogene-
ous. 
What percentage of the respective portfolio is allocated to for-profit organisations, social en-
terprises, non-profit and charitable organisations, and public sector organisations? The portfo-
lio allocation is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Portfolio allocation for for-profits, social enterprises, non-profits and public sector organiza-
tions 
We tested the influence of the investees and CDCs vs. other investors with respect to the port-
folio distribution using an ANOVA. Overall the ANOVA was significant p < .00001, df = 9, F = 
19.6). The r2 of the model was .57. There was a significant difference between CDCs and other 
investors (p = .0157, df = 1, F = 6.0) and between the investee groups (P < .0001, DF = 4, f = 
32.7).  Furthermore we found a significant interaction between CDCs vs. others and investee 
groups (p < .0001, df = 4, F = 6.5). There is a significant interaction suggesting that CDCs have a 
different portfolio allocation than other social finance investors (p < .00001, df = 4, F = 74.24). 
CDCs have significant more investments in for-profit organizations, and fewer investments in 
social enterprises, and non-profits than other social investors. 
Which financial products are used for which type or organisation? We present the results for 























Social finance, social enterprises and non-profits Final Report 
12 
 
Table 2: Number of products and services used for different types of organizations 




Public Others Total 
Loans (General) 25 20 9 3 3 60 
Loans (secured) 25 18 11 1 1 56 
Mortgages 16 12 11 3 0 42 
Loans (unsecured) 17 12 9 1 0 39 
Working capital 16 6 6 2 0 30 
Guarantees 15 7 6 2 0 30 
Loans (subordinate) 15 8 4 0 0 27 
Grants 3 9 12 3 0 27 
Line of credit 9 6 7 2 0 24 
Equity 17 4 2 1 0 24 
Loans (below market interest) 3 6 7 1 0 17 
Leases 5 1 3 1 0 10 
Donations 0 4 3 0 0 7 
Bonds 3 0 1 0 0 4 
Table 2 shows that the most used products are loans, mortgages, working capital, and guaran-
tees. In order to analyze which types of products are used to finance different types of organi-
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Table 3: Percentage of product use for financing different types of organizations 





Loans (General) 14.79% 17.70% 9.89% 15.11% 
Loans (secured) 14.79% 15.93% 12.09% 14.11% 
Mortgages 9.47% 10.62% 12.09% 10.58% 
Loans (unsecured) 10.06% 10.62% 9.89% 9.82% 
Working capital 9.47% 5.31% 6.59% 7.56% 
Guarantees 8.88% 6.19% 6.59% 7.56% 
Loans (subordinate) 8.88% 7.08% 4.40% 6.80% 
Grants 1.78% 7.96% 13.19% 6.80% 
Line of credit 5.33% 5.31% 7.69% 6.05% 
Equity 10.06% 3.54% 2.20% 6.05% 
Loans (below market interest) 1.78% 5.31% 7.69% 4.28% 
Leases 2.96% 0.88% 3.30% 2.52% 
Donations 0.00% 3.54% 3.30% 1.76% 
Bonds 1.78% 0.00% 1.10% 1.01% 
We analyzed the use of products and services on the basis of Table 3. If we have a look on those 
products and services that are used in more than 10 percent of financing, loans and mortgages 
are the most used financing services. For financing for-profit organizations general and secured 
loans are most often used before unsecured loans and equity. For social enterprises again gen-
eral, secured and unsecured loans and mortgages are the most used products. As expected, 
grants are the most used product for non-profits in addition to secured loans and mortgages. 
Because financing public organizations and others did only occur a few times we do not analyze 
th se organizations in detail. The res lts of a Chi2 test for the products and services and financ-
ing for-profits, social enterprises and non-profits suggest that the products and services are 
used significantly different dependent on the type of organization that is financed (N = 395, Chi2 
=  44.99, p = 0.012). The frequency, expected frequency and Chi2 contribution are presented in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4: Frequency, expected frequencies and Chi2 contribution of products and services; products and 







Loans (general) frequency 25 20 9 
 expected frequency 24.3 16.5 13.1 
 Chi2 contr. 0 0.7 1.3 
Loans (secured) frequency 27 20 12 
 expected frequency 26.6 18.1 14.3 
 Chi2 contr. 0 0.2 0.4 
Loans (unsecured) frequency 17 12 9 
 expected frequency 17.1 11.6 9.2 
 Chi2 contr. 0 0 0 
Loans (subordinate) frequency 15 8 4 
 expected frequency 12.2 8.3 6.6 
 Chi2 contr. 0.7 0 1 
Loans (below market interest) frequency 3 8 7 
 expected frequency 8.1 5.5 4.4 
 Chi2 contr. 3.2 1.1 1.6 
Mortgages frequency 16 12 11 
 expected frequency 17.6 11.9 9.5 
 Chi2 contr. 0.1 0 0.2 
Line of credit frequency 10 6 7 
 expected frequency 10.4 7 5.6 
 Chi2 contr. 0 0.2 0.4 
Working capital frequency 20 8 8 
 expected frequency 16.2 11 8.7 
 Chi2 contr. 0.9 0.8 0.1 
Leases frequency 7 2 4 
 expected frequency 5.9 4 3.2 
 Chi2 contr. 0.2 1 0.2 
Equity frequency 17 4 2 
 expected frequency 10.4 7 5.6 
 Chi2 contr. 4.2 1.3 2.3 
Guarantees frequency 15 7 6 
 expected frequency 12.6 8.6 6.8 
 Chi2 contr. 0.4 0.3 0.1 
Bonds frequency 3 0 1 
 expected frequency 1.8 1.2 1 
 Chi2 contr. 0.8 1.2 0 
Grants frequency 3 9 12 
 expected frequency 10.8 7.4 5.8 
 Chi2 contr. 5.6 0.4 6.5 
Donations frequency 0 5 4 
 expected frequency 4.1 2.8 2.2 
 Chi2 contr. 4.1 1.8 1.5 
The results of the Chi2 test suggest that loans with interests below market are used less for fi-
nancing for-profits. Equity is used less for both for-profits and non-profits. Grants are used 
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financing for-profits as expected. Generally it standard products are used to finance the differ-
ent types of organizations. For social enterprises standard financing is used. Donations are used 
to finance both social enterprises and non-profits. 
The freque cy of prod cts and services used f r financing different types of organisations are 
presented in Figure 3 as well. Again it shows the frequent use of loans for all types of organisa-
tions and the use of grants for non-profits. 
 
Figure 3: Products and services used for for-profits, social enterprises, non-profits and public organiza-
tions 
Again we tested for differences between CDCs and other social investors using t-tests. The re-
sults are presented in Table 5 that shows the average use of the products by CDCs and other so-
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Table 6: Average portfolio allocation to different company sizes for for-profits, social enterprises, non-
profits and public organizations 
Financed organization Start-ups Micro Small Medium Large Others 
For-profit 21-40% 21-40% 21-40% 1-20% 1-20% 1-20% 
Social enterprise 21-40%% 21-40% 21-40% 1-20% 1-20% 0% 
Non-profit 1-20% 1-20% 21-40% 1-20% 0% 0% 
Public 0% 1-20% 1-20% 0% 1-20% 0% 
Total 21-40% 21-40% 21-40% 1-20% 1-20% 1-20% 
Generally the financing institutions financed mainly start-ups, micro and small enterprises. We 
could not find significant differences in the size of the organizations between the types of fi-
nanced organizations. With respect to CDCs vs. other investors we found differences for in-
vestments in start-ups and microenterprises. CDCs invest a higher amount in start-ups (p = 
.0063, t = -2.8270) and micro-enterprises (p = .034, t = -2.1691) than other investors do. 
Let us analyze the financial risks that are connected with financing different types of organiza-
tions. The participants rated for-profits, social enterprises, non-profits and public sector organi-
zations with respect to their risk and returns. The rating was done on a 5-point scale with the 
following values: 
x 1: very low 
x 2: low 
x 3: moderate 
x 4: high 
x 5: very high 
For all risk evaluation items but for returns higher values correspond to higher risks. The means 
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Table 7: Means for the risk evaluation of for-profits, social enterprises, non-profits and public organi-
zations. Risk categories with significance differences between the types of organizations are printed in 
bold, df = 3. 






Public F p 
Financial Risk 3.16 3.59 3.57 3.73 1.11 .347 
Financial Returns 3.29 2.5 2.41 3.5 4.32 .0064 
Management Risk 3.55 3.71 3.84 4.05 1.04 .377 
Public Relations Risk 2.94 3.30 3.7 4.26 6.58 .0004 
Ethical Risk 3.16 3.15 3.53 3.91 1.96 .125 
Inefficiency 3.16 3.59 3.83 4.29 4.08 .0087 
Fidelity to Mission 3.07 3.2 3.46 3.89 1.31 .2739 
Cost Structures 3.25 3.4 2.93 2.36 3.68 .0149 
Governance 3.14 3.52 3.89 3.9 2.56 .0590 
Access to Capital 3.52 4 4.10 3.82 1.41 .2447 
Access to Securities 4 4.43 4.76 4 .76 .5203 
Revenue Uncertainty 3.62 4.07 4.18 4 1.16 .3284 
Accountability 3.79 3.37 3.69 4.35 2.00 .1192 
Liquidity 3.5 3.90 4.19 3.84 1.38 .2519 
Size 2.87 3.13 3.34 3.5 .99 .4010 
Tax Regulation 3.36 3.3 3.5 3.94 .73 .5393 
Financial Regulation 3.15 3.23 3.5 3.74 1.00 .3945 
Regulatory Burdens 3.21 3.31 3.64 3.9 1.62 .1891 
Academic Expertise 2.55 2.86 3.08 3.42 1.32 .2711 
Community Sophistication 2.79 3.45 3.68 3.67 2.59 .0573 
Community Networks 2.90 3.63 3.88 3.89 3.49 .0186 
Credit Management Expertise 3.32 3.77 3.68 3.83 1.00 .3949 
Investment Advisors 2.8 3.41 3.64 3.72 2.76 .0457 
Public Sector Funding 2.27 3.74 4.39 4.4 21.81 <.00001 
Tax Incentives 2.79 2.82 3.46 4.67 7.82 <.00001 
Founder/leader Domination 3.43 3.79 3.66 4.19 1.21 .3098 
 
Table&2.7:&Sources&of&risk&in&for5proﬁt,&social&enterprise,&non5proﬁt&and&public&sector&
















Figure 4: The use of models, instruments, and tools to track financial investments 
Generally the results suggest that models that track social finance investments are not often 
used. Furthermore the results of a Hotelling test demonstrates that the models are used differ-
ently (F = 4.36, T = 29.2, p = .0015). The highest frequency for tracking social finance invest-
ments has monitoring community partner support. Impact reporting and investment standards 
a e least used together ith mathematical models for on-financial returns. Though 41.2 per-
cent of the respondents stated that they use different risk models than for for-profit invest-
ments, it seems that specific models for non-profits and social enterprises are not common yet. 
Furthermore we could not find any significant differences in the use of the models between 
CDCs and other organizations. 
Qualitativ  Results of the Survey 
The qualitative responses identified little consensus on the measurement tools social providers 
use. Although we have only received six responses, from the two providers used the Global Im-
pact Investment Reporting System (GIIRS), a d one of these also used the Impact Reporting In-
vestment Standards (IRIS) and B Corp. Of the remainder, two respondents mentioned that 
measurement tools were not applicable, one used the Community Development Financial Insti-
tution Rating System, and one used a proprietary model. Note that as a majority (57.1%) of our 
respondents use different risk assessment models for social finance investments than the ones 
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Conclusions(With!this!survey!we!wanted!to!answer!the!following!research!questions:!1. What!types!of!social!finance!institutions!are!involved!in!financing!social!enterprises!and!nonGprofits?!!2. How!are!the!portfolios!of!these!institutions!allocated!to!social!enterprises!and!nonG!profits?!!3. What!products!and!services!are!used!to!finance!social!enterprises!and!nonGprofits!and!are!
! 70!















































































































































































































































































































By 1986 the Action Slate had taken every seat on the Vancity board and has dominated the
board ever since. The Action Slate viewed Vancity as a tool that could be used to leverage
broader positive social change in Vancouver and quickly set about creating new programmes
to achieve this. In 1986, Vancity created Canada’s first SRI fund, the Ethical Growth Fund,
which soon proved that there was a market for ethically screened investments in Canada. This
was the first of many projects aimed at directing Vancity’s assets towards sustainable or local
economic development projects. Current arms of the broader Vancity sphere include Vancity
Enterprises, the Vancity Community Foundation and the Resilient Capital Fund.
Analysis of Vancity’s 2000–2010 annual reports
Social financing involves two concepts: impact and blended value creation. SFIs should demon-
strate their social or environmental sustainability impact and also support investments that
produce social or environmental returns while also generating financial returns. To determine
whether Vancity delivers the financial portion of this blended value we examine the credit
union’s annual reports from 2000 to 2011. Following this, we conduct a content analysis of
Vancity’s 2010 annual report to analyse whether the credit union also provides social or environ-
mental value.
Starting with Vancity’s financial performance, Table 1 clearly shows strong growth trends for
the credit union with respect to the number of members, employees, branches, loans, deposits,
equity shares and total assets. After experiencing increasing growth from 2000 to 2007, the
2008 financial crisis saw a levelling off of growth until 2011 when asset increased to more
than $16 billion (Vancity 2012a).
One important aspect of social banking is how the assets, deposits and savings are channelled
into loans, their most important service. Some studies show that SFIs have difficulty channelling
their increased savings and deposits towards lending when they experience rapid growth (Weber
2011). As we see in Table 2 the loans per assets as well as the loans per deposits and equity shares
percentages are high. Many social banking SFIs have a lower rate and the average of the loans-
per-asset percentage of the members of the GABV was 71% between 2007 and 2010, a ratio that
Vancity has exceeded. A one-sample t-test that compared the average loan-to-asset ratio of
Vancity with that of other members of GABV resulted in a significant difference and suggested
a significantly higher loan-to-asset rate for Vancity (t ¼29.75, df ¼ 97, P , 0.00001). This















2000 266,213 1570 43 6,054,379 6,191,577 6,889,509
2001 275,721 1622 41 6,706,487 6,744,487 7,511,889
2002 286,365 1706 41 7,071,926 7,610,695 8,223,830
2003 300,945 1916 43 7,691,599 8,425,665 9,030,061
2004 302,032 2050 44 8,535,816 8,950,835 10,453,765
2005 337,107 1995 50 9,984,474 10,558,155 11,756,319
2006 354,663 2196 50 10,888,592 10,221,195 12,281,087
2007 387,762 2372 60 12,583,832 11,208,389 14,106,527
2008 407,121 2384 61 12,280,667 11,933,346 14,531,675
2009 414,377 2228 59 11,955,802 12,319,752 14,410,528
2010 417,211 2281 59 12,495,790 12,692,651 14,468,165
2011 479,528 2459 59 13,249,105 13,365,800 16,127,117























demonstrates that Vancity has performed far better than the GABV in maki g use of its assets to
create loans overall. The performance is comparable with a benchmark of Canadian credit unions
that had a loan-to-asset ratio of 82.4% at the end of 2011 (Credit Union Central of Canada 2012a).
However, Vancity achieves this benchmark while providing impact loans, which is not the
primary objective of the other credit unions in the benchmark.
Tables 1 and 2 present data on the growth and the use of the capital; however, they do not
provide information about the financial sustainability and the financial success of Vancity.
Table 3 presents figures showing the earnings, returns and capital ratios for the credit union.
Table 3 suggests that Vancity has been able to maintain its financial performance over the
course of the past decade. These years included the global financial crisis of 2008 and the
years following, in which Vancity’s performance was comparable with that of Canada’s commer-
cial banks. These, in turn, outperformed most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment countries’ banks. Similarly, the capital ratio is a proxy for the financial health of financial
institutions and for its ability to survive financial crises. Vancity was able to increase its capital
ratio over the last 10 years.
Although some caution should be taken when comparing Vancity with Canada’s commercial
banks, such as the Toronto Dominion Financial Group (TD), the most successful bank in Canada
in 2010, with more than $619 billion assets under management, the comparison is still insightful.
As Figure 1 shows, indicators such as compounded annual growth of Vancity’s loans, deposits
and equity shares, the number of employees, branches and total assets were not as high as that
Table 2. Vancity’s loans per assets and loans per deposits and equity shares.













Table 3. Vancity’s net earnings, returns on assets and equity, and capital ratio.
Year Net earnings ($ thousands) Return on assets (%) Return on equity (%) Capital ratio (%)
2000 21,001 0.32 7.70 10.50
2001 25,927 0.36 9.10 10.40
2002 39,572 0.51 11.70 10.90
2003 44,472 0.54 11.60 11.60
2004 57,200 0.63 13.00 12.10
2005 47,100 0.46 10.10 13.80
2006 54,300 0.38 8.80 13.00
2007 32,800 0.25 5.90 12.17
2008 45,800 0.33 7.60 12.36
2009 53,800 0.38 8.00 13.52
2010 77,414 0.54 10.60 13.98
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of TD. However, Vancity was stronger than TD with respect to net earnings, and the return on
assets and equity. Both financial institutions managed to increase their capital ratios, something
common to the entire Canadian banking sector which emerged from the financial crisis as one
of the world’s healthiest (Anonymous 2010).
Analysing Vancity’s annual reports through the lens, their social and environmental impact
involves looking at both the organization’s mission and the services it offers. Vancity’s mission
statement explicitly defines weal h as being ‘beyond the trade-offs assumed in a triple-bottom-
line approach to one that creates true blended value’ (VanCity 2011, 19). This mission statement
was developed in 2008 and complements their strategy outlining that Vancity will guarantee ‘their
efforts to create community benefits that are financially sustainable, provide adequate reserves to
withstand a turbulent economy, and reinvest to build infrastructure for the long term’ (VanCity
2011, 19). Unlike most SFIs, Vancity explicitly emphasizes the importance of financial sustain-
ability for achieving their social finance goals (Weber and Remer 2011a). In addition, they
have developed a strategy to connect their branch network to community well-being, offering
financial services to clients that can deliver blended value and foster community development.
Vancity’s vision and strategy suggest that the credit union is following the main concepts of
social finance, social impact and blended returns. Whether their operations also follow this
concept requires further analysis.
One important Vancity product line is their high-impact community investment loans. These
lo s support the areas of affordable housing, social-purpose real est te, local, natural nd organic
food, the environment and energy efficiency, and social enterprises and social venture. The
produ t lin grew $300 million from 2009 to 2010. In contrast to that, the Credit Union
Central of Canada reports that in 2010, Canada’s credit unions contributed more than $37.5
million to their communities in the form of direct donations, financial services, sponsorships,
Figure 1. Compounded annual growth in selected financial figures of Vancity and TD.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We cannot sacrifice society and the 
environment while collecting good financial 
returns in the long run. It’s only a matter of 
time before we realize that.
— Pension Fund Analyst, Quebec
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! 201!5  E XECUTIVE SU M MARY
The financial sector in Canada, and globally, is in the 
midst of a period of volatility and uncertainty. Despite 
these challenges, there has been an increase in interest 
in the topic of social finance. This trend is consistent 
with international activity, driven by investors that are 
seeking a combination of financial and social returns to 
their capital.
This report provides new insights into the issues and 
opportunities around social finance as perceived by the 
Canadian financial sector. Through a combination of 
interviews, a national survey, and focus groups, we identi-
fied several key themes that relate to the awareness and 
activity around social finance, as well as the challenges 
and barriers to engaging in social finance. We provide a 
set of recommendations to address these issues, in order 
to increase the level of awareness and activity around 
social finance in the Canadian financial sector.
Our research discovered key issues and challenges 
related to the level of awareness and activity around 
social finance, as we describe below:
  There is generally a low level of awareness around 
social finance across the financial sector, apart from 
niches such as credit unions and those involved in the 
”green economy”.
  There is a higher level of awareness of associated 
terms such as socially responsible investing or 
corporate social responsibility. In a similar vein, there 
is an increased appreciation of the importance of 
non-financial considerations.
  There is confusion on the language and terminology 
used to describe social finance and associated terms, 
even among those who were somewhat familiar with 
these issues. Compounding this issue, information 
on social finance is usually accessed via mainstream 
media, which is often fragmented or lacks depth.
  Many impact investment opportunities are currently 
not accessible or suitable for mainstream investors, 
and there is often not enough product to create a 
balanced portfolio for retail or institutional clients. 
As well, social finance investments are generally 
perceived to be high risk.
  There remains a gap in social finance knowledge 
among financial advisors and wealth managers, with 
few channels to educate clients about their invest-
ment options.
In response to these issues outlined above, we proposed 
a set of recommendations in order to advance the 
level of awareness and activity of social finance in 
Canada, including:
  Increased sensitivity toward the proper use of financial 
terminology among social finance advocates as well as 
potential investees for social finance.
  Targeted education and awareness building of financial 
advisors and asset managers through industry associa-
tions and certification programs.
  Encourage the creation of information on impact 
investment opportunities, and reduce the barriers for 
community organizations to participate in innovative 
financing mechanisms.
  Equip prospective investees with tools necessary to 
enhance their financial and operational performance, 
and to enhance their investment readiness.
  Equip investors and intermediaries with tools unique 
to evaluating the risk and performance of social 
finance products.
  Strategically involve government to mitigate short-
term investment risks in order to enhance long-term 
sustainability of potential investments, develop market 
infrastructure, and strengthen intermediary capacity.
  Provide clarity to institutional investors on their 
fiduciary obligations that are consistent with investing 
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The financial sector is currently in a period of volatility 
and apprehension. While Canada seems to be better 
positioned than comparable countries, there remain 
ongoing concerns around economic growth, unemploy-
ment, and currency fluctuations. Today, the investment 
climate reflects the pessimistic mood of investors. There 
has been a corresponding flight to low-risk assets, 
particularly for institutional investors.
Despite these challenges, there are reasons to be 
optimistic. Investors have adjusted their risk/return 
expectations to more reasonable levels than we have 
seen over the past decade. At the same time, parallel 
movements are seeking to re-imagine capitalism as a 
system that defines value beyond a narrow measure 
of financial returns, and which recognizes the non-
financial impacts of corporate and investment decisions 
as critical to the long-term performance and health of 
corporations. The limitations of modern portfolio theory 
have been recognized, and many of its core tenets need 
to be revised (Christian 2011).
These trends can be viewed as an opportunity for social 
finance in Canada. There is momentum globally, and 
increasingly in Canada as well, to explore alternative 
asset classes to those that perpetuated the financial 
crisis of 2008. As an example, microfinance was the 
only asset class that generated a positive financial 
return during the crisis, and many global institutional 
investors have since invested large amounts of capital 
into the sector. Socially-responsible investing - notably 
through the UNPRI signatories – is gaining traction 
among the largest global and Canadian institutional 
investors. JP Morgan has estimated the potential for 
impact investment capital over the next 10 years to be 
in the range of $400 billion to nearly $1 trillion globally 
(Saltuk et al, 2011).
Despite many of these positive developments and 
opportunities, the range of activity and invested capital 
in social finance is relatively small. Social finance in 
Canada is at a nascent stage of development, and is 
currently characterized by its “uncoordinated innova-
tion”; disparate entrepreneurial activities and business 
model innovations are occurring in response to market 
needs and policy incentives (Fulton and Freirich, 2009). 
While the market size for social finance has not yet 
been definitively established, the Social Investment 
Organization’s most recent survey estimates impact 
investments in Canada at $4.5 billion (Bragg, 2010). 
There is a strong demand for finance that can generate 
both financial and social returns, as Canada’s social 
sector remains undercapitalized relative to the needs 
placed on it. 
While Canada has a long history of credit unions 
and cooperatives, particularly in Quebec and British 
Columbia, we also have a relatively underdeveloped 
social finance sector that is characterized by significant 
gaps in knowledge, infrastructure, service providers, 
and deal flow opportunities. These issues are not unique 
to Canada, and are also present in countries such as 
the US and UK that have a more mature social finance 
sector. To date, Canada has seen relatively limited 
engagement of the traditional financial sector in social 
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THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS REPORT ARE TO:
  Provide a Canada-wide overview of the level of 
awareness of social finance among the general 
finance sector;
  Identify whether raised awareness of social finance 
would serve to increase social finance investments;
  Identify the gaps in knowledge that exist within the 
financial sector regarding social finance;
  Identify barriers to investment by the financial sector 
in social finance options or opportunities;
  Proposes strategies and approaches designed to 
build awareness across the financial sector, to create 
investment in social finance; and,
  Provide recommendations for next steps for the 
federal government to help advance social finance 
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METHODOLOGY 
& LIMITATIONS
Our methodology consisted of a range of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches to create a robust picture 
of the state of social finance in Canada. Collected 
data was then triangulated to identify key themes 
and trends. The following is a summary of the key 
methods that we utilized:
  DOCUMENT REVIEW: 1 We conducted an extensive 
document review that included key domestic and 
international publications, and also conducted 
in-depth analyses of websites, press releases, and 
case studies. 
  KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS: We conducted 47 
in-person or telephone interviews with stakehold-
ers from the finance sector, across the country, 
and within different sub-sectors. Semi-structured 
interviews lasted between 30-60 minutes, and took 
place in-person, via phone or Skype. Interviews 
were conducted with individuals with various 
degrees of understanding and experience in social 
finance (including those without any experience). 
Informants were selected using a mixture of con-
venience sampling of people in Purpose Capital’s 
network, survey respondents and a snowball 
sample of people suggested by interviewees. 
  SURVEY: We conducted a widely-distributed survey, 
targeting respondents from various sub-sectors 
(banking, mutual funds, pension funds, venture capi-
tal, credit unions, and insurance providers) across the 
country. Within these sub-sectors, we targeted the 
members of Canada’s major financial sector associa-
tions, and also directed the survey to key individuals 
within these networks, reaching out to a total of 317 
recipients (some of these individuals represented 
groups of professionals). Survey questions covered 
similar subject matter to the interviews except for 
the additional follow-up questions for clarification.
  FOCUS GROUPS: We conducted focus groups of 
targeted participants in 3 major urban centres 
(Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal) in order to 
validate our key hypotheses and findings. In all, 21 
participants attended focus groups, representing 
a diverse range of positions within the financial 
sector. Participants possessed varying degrees of 
awareness of social finance, ranging from those 
with no prior knowledge of the concept, to those 
already engaged in social finance activity.
The following table relates the key objectives as 
articulated in the Statement of Work to the method-
ologies we utilized to capture and validate data.
1.  Please refer to the Appendix
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT DOCUMENT REVIEW INTERVIEWS SURVEY FOCUS GROUPS
The extent to which social finance 
instruments and mechanisms are 
understood across the finance sector
6 6 6 6
Whether raised awareness of social 
finance would serve to increase social 
finance investments from the general 
financial sector
 6 6 6
Other barriers to social investment 6 6 6 6
Recommendations for a practical way 
forward from these findings  6 6 6
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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LIMITATIONS
LOW RESPONSE RATES TO THE SURVEY: Overall 
our survey respondents represented the breadth of 
the financial sector, though responses were heavily 
weighted towards credit unions. Despite our broad 
outreach to financial sector associations as well as 
direct survey respondents, we achieved a relatively 
low response rate. We distributed the survey to over 
317 recipients (institutions, associations, and individu-
als), and received 72 responses. We attempted to 
mitigate this issue through the use of multiple highly 
targeted survey rounds, though subsequent feedback 
suggested that surveying would continue to provide a 
limited set of respondents. As a result, we increased 
our outreach to individuals via interviews and focus 
groups, and selectively targeted areas where we 
sought further detail or validation on preliminary 
survey findings.
SELF-SELECTION BIAS: As expected, many respon-
dents to our requests for survey responses and 
interviews were disproportionately well-versed or 
interested in social finance. This bias was reflected in 
the survey, where a relatively high rate of respondents 
identified as being from the credit union sector. 
We addressed this limitation by reaching out to the 
30% 22% 14% 11%
CREDIT UNIONS INVESTMENT BANK INVESTMENT FUND CHARTERED BANK
6% INSURANCE COMPANY 3% PENSION FUND 3% VENTURE CAPITAL / PRIVATE EQUITY
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sectors that were underrepresented in the survey, 
such that our interview and focus group samples 
were relatively uniform across the targeted finan-
cial sectors.
INCONSISTENCY AROUND LANGUAGE: The sector 
continues to face a challenge around the usage of 
language. For example, terms with different meanings 
are often used interchangeably, resulting in a lack of 
clarity and understanding. This issue was mitigated by 
the use of clear language that was tested in advance 
of deploying our data collection tools, and the use of 
examples when asking questions through the survey, 
interview, and focus group tools. We note this as a 
general challenge for the growth of social finance, 
and elaborate on this issue later in the report. 
NEGATIVE BIAS IN CURRENT FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
There is a disproportionate focus within the financial 
sector on financial returns, as opposed to social or 
environmental returns. Our approach to addressing 
this risk was to conduct focus groups where partici-
pants were targeted and segmented according to 
certain characteristics or experiences (for example, 
bringing together existing investment professionals 
from the socially-responsible investment space). This 
allowed us to build a granular understanding of the 
key issues that these sub-sectors face.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FINDING: THERE IS LOW AWARENESS OF 
SOCIAL FINANCE
Overall knowledge of social finance in the Canadian 
financial sector is low, based on our findings from 
the interviews in particular. However, social finance 
concepts tend to be more familiar to people work-
ing in the niche financial sectors such as socially 
responsible investing and credit unions. Due to the 
self-selection bias in our survey, our results reflect 
a higher level of awareness and engagement with 
social finance than that of the mainstream finan-
cial community.
Our interviews and focus groups demonstrated 
several key knowledge gaps. For many participants, 
the term social finance was associated with charity or 
lower financial returns. More broadly, social finance 
was often used interchangeably with related terms 
like corporate social responsibility, socially respon-
sible investing, and microfinance, even amongst 
individuals who were relatively knowledgeable. As 
well, many survey respondents expressed a general 
interest in learning more about social finance and 
impact investing.
Outside of academics and some NGOs with a 
specific mandate to participate in the social 
financing sector or community, there’s very little 
discussion going on that I’m aware of.
— Public Foundation Executive, British Columbia
[To me] social finance sounds like glorified philan-
thropy; only instead of a tax receipt, you can hope 
to get your money back.
— Investment Bank Executive, Ontario
Credit union respondents, on the other hand, 
demonstrated much greater awareness of social 
finance than the mainstream financial community. 
This finding is consistent with the Social Investment 
Organization’s 2010 findings that of the $4.45 
billion in Canadian impact investments, $951 million 
come from credit unions outside Quebec and $1.9 
billion come from Quebec Development Capital and 
Solidarity Finance (Bragg 2010), much of which has 
origins in the Desjardins movement. For every social 
finance term we asked about in our surveys, credit 
union respondents said they were more familiar than 
our other respondents, and we also saw this pattern 
in our interviews.
FINDING: THERE IS INCREASED 
AWARENESS OF (THE IMPORTANCE OF) 
NON-FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Consistent with broader trends in the business world, 
there is an enhanced focus on non-financial consid-
erations, primarily within the context of a broader 
interpretation of risk. Environmental, social and gov-
ernance (ESG) indicators are primarily seen as ways 
of gaining a richer understanding of the material risks 
involved in an investment (usually for publicly-traded 
companies). This has reinforced the need and demand 
for non-financial information, which has in turn 
prompted increased investment activity that makes 
use of this information.
“As an increasing number of institutional investors 
have adopted the self-interested, rational approach, 
its limitations and inadequacies have become increas-
ingly apparent. In particular, the rational investor 
does not possess the capabilities of reason to assess 
the objective well-being of beneficiaries, recognize 
fundamental sources of investment reward in the real 
economy, or fulfill the fiduciary obligation to allocate 
benefits impartially between current and future 
generations.” (Lydenberg, 2012)
Negative screening is often the primary tool around 
ESG indicators, though there is some evidence that 
the tools available to evaluate non-financial consider-
ations on the social dimensions (the S in ESG) remain 
limited. These frameworks are being operationalized 
through increased adoption of corporate social 
responsibility initiatives as a way to reduce reputa-
tional risk, and the growth of socially-responsible 
investing to provide a more balanced interpretation of 
the full range of risks that public companies face.
AWARENESS OF SOCIAL FINANCE
What is the level of social finance awareness within the financial sector?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FINDING: THERE IS SOME AWARENESS OF 
TERMS RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH 
SOCIAL FINANCE
In the general financial community, awareness is low 
and confusing terminology (some of it disseminated 
by social finance advocates) often clouds a clear 
understanding. This is partly the result of inconsistent 
use of financial sector terminology by social finance 
advocates. For example, “Social Impact Bonds” are 
not bonds in any mainstream financial sense. Even the 
term “social” in social finance is confusing, as to many 
the label seemingly excludes environmental impact.
That said, there is awareness of many terms closely 
related to social finance. Socially responsible invest-
ment is quite familiar to people in the mainstream 
financial community, with 94% of our survey 
respondents identifying as either somewhat familiar 
or familiar with the term. Similarly, corporate 
social responsibility was a term that came up in 
many of our interviews. As well, in specific niches 
particularly among younger advisors and analysts, 
there is familiarity with concepts such as climate 
risk, sustainability and the general mainstreaming 
of “green economy” concepts. There was relatively 
less awareness of social issues or, when there was 
awareness, of how to take it into account.
We have a mandate to do a triple-bottom line 
evaluation of impact, but it has been difficult for 
us to develop the protocols and procedures for 
determining social benefit because we’re one step 
or two steps removed from that end recipient.
— Public foundation, British Columbia
Advisors note that there is demand for social finance 
from some private clients, though it is difficult 
to know how often there have been requests for 
products. Several advisors noted that high net worth 
individuals have asked for socially-oriented invest-
ments. This trend is consistent with evidence in other 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom (Elliot 2011).
This [trend] is very exciting to me as a financial 
advisor. My clients are charitable but they are 
also interested in earning a good return on their 
investments, and if they can have an opportunity 
to include such [blended] investments such as 
these in their portfolio, they would be enthusiastic.
— Financial advisor, Alberta
GLOBAL TREND: INCREASED 
INTEREST IN IMPACT INVESTING
Investors are becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the social returns on their 
investments, and not exclusively with their 
financial returns (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & 
Saltuk 2010). The impact investment philoso-
phy unlocks substantial capital to build a more 
sustainable and equitable global economy, 
while allowing for diversification across 
geographies and asset classes (Palandjian 
2010). Impact investments have the potential 
to complement philanthropy and government 
intervention as a potent force for addressing 
global challenges; these investments actively 
seek to place capital in businesses and funds 
that can provide solutions at a scale that phil-
anthropic intervention alone cannot 
reach (Fulton & Freireich 2009).
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2.    We caution readers from interpreting these results across the general financial sector given the self-selection bias and limited sample size of survey 
responses, as described in the section on limitations.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! 210!1 4  AWAR EN E S S O F SO CIAL F I NAN CE
FINDING: INFORMATION ON SOCIAL 
FINANCE IS USUALLY ACCESSED VIA 
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
Mainstream and specialized media were the largest 
noted sources of information on social finance and 
impact investing. Interviewees cited The Economist, 
Globe & Mail, Financial Post and the Harvard Business 
Review as media through which they learned about 
social finance.
However, learning about social finance through 
these mainstream media outlets has not neces-
sarily reduced confusion. Coverage appears to be 
fragmented and light on details, rarely distinguishing 
social finance from more widely-known concepts like 
socially responsible investing. This lack of depth in 
many ways contributes to confusion over terminology, 
and does not naturally lead to actionable information 
that advisors and analysts could follow-up on for 
product recommendations.
FINDING: THERE IS SOME STIGMA AROUND 
SOCIAL FINANCE
Despite a growing awareness of social and ecological 
considerations in business decision-making, a lack 
of clarity around the definition and scope of social 
finance contributes to the perception of investments 
in this area being high-risk. Beyond financial instru-
ments, there is a general stigma around social finance 
investments and related institutions, particularly 
the association with the non-profit and charitable 
sector. The perception is that non-profits rely heavily 
on grants, which in turn lessens their capacity for 
properly managing credit, and contributes to a higher 
risk profile.
There is also a notable level of apprehension around 
government involvement, which is perceived to skew 
the market towards unattractive or unsustainable 
investments. Interestingly, the stigma attached to 
grant-receiving organizations in the social sector 
extends to revenue-generating social enterprises, 
cooperatives and credit unions that do not receive 
grants. It is believed that these organizations have 
significantly higher governance risks, despite a lack 
of evidence to suggest that the risks are significantly 
different from other financial institutions.
Why would they [charities] even want 
to ask for somebody’s capital that they 
have to repay, when they can just go 
to their same old donor base that has 
been loyal for so long and ask for it for 
free? That is a structural problem, and 
has more to do with the charities than 
the providers of capital.
— Venture capital, Ontario
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
OVER $1 BILLION
$500 MILLION – $1 BILLION
$100 MILLION – $500 MILLION 
$10 MILLION – $100 MILLION 
UNDER $10 MILLION 
UNSURE YES, HAVE DISCUSSED IMPACT INVESTING YES, PERFORM IMPACT INVESTING NO EXPOSURE TO IMPACT INVESTING
IF YOU OR YOUR DEPARTMENT MANAGES ASSETS,
WHAT IS THE TOTAL VALUE OF ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT















































































































































































































Gauging the connection between awareness of social finance and social finance activity is difficult since the 
overall level of awareness is low.
SURVEY RESPONDENTS’ LEVEL OF FAMILIARITY 
WITH SOCIAL FINANCE RELATED TERMS
ACTIVITY
Does awareness lead to social finance activity?!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FINDING: CREDIT UNIONS ARE 
CONDUCTING MORE SOCIAL 
FINANCE ACTIVITY THAN OTHER 
FINANCIAL SECTORS
Similar to findings on awareness, credit unions 
reported more social finance activity than other 
financial sectors. Members of this sector clearly 
highlighted that demand for social finance products 
often came from their member-owners directly. This 
meant that some of the credit unions were first-
movers who had to develop social finance products 
and the systems to manage them on their own, rather 
than using models that had been developed by other 
financial organizations. In essence, their stakeholders 
required them to invest resources on developing 
products before there had been a clear demonstra-
tion of their viability in the marketplace.
Trailblazers in social finance recognized their flexible 
institutional structures as a key strategy for suc-
cess. A variety of debt, equity and even grant-based 
instruments are used to support social investments 
and may come from different arms of the parent 
organization. This means that in practice, financing 
for a project could come from a small business loan, 
private equity, a foundation grant or some combina-
tion of these. Similarly, these trailblazers often had an 
“institutional indifference” meaning that they were 
equally open to investing in for-profit, not-for-profit 
and co-operative organizations.
FINDING: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS HAVE 
SETTLED ON ESG ASSESSMENTS
Institutional investors such as pension funds, have 
adopted some ESG assessments, but in most cases 
have not broadened their lens beyond that. There has 
been an increase in interest resulting from a number 
of institutional investors signing on to the United 
National Principles for Responsible Investing (UNPRI) 3  
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 4, including 
some of Canada’s largest institutional investors.
However, there is still a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding fiduciary responsibility. Some institutional 
investors have found the logic of SRI appealing, and 
see ESG considerations as a necessary component of 
a holistic risk-assessment and a long-term orienta-
tion. However, other institutional investors retain a 
narrower focus on prioritizing financial returns. In 
some cases where institutional investors are seeking 
to integrate ESG considerations, there can be signifi-
cant internal pressures against this shift such as from 
legal counsel or investment committee members.
FINDING: LOW AWARENESS AMONG 
BOTH ADVISORS AND CLIENTS 
PERPETUATES LOW DEMAND FOR SOCIAL 
FINANCE PRODUCTS
Investment advisors had low familiarity with social 
finance in general, and social finance products in 
particular. Related to the challenge of a lack of acces-
sible products for retail clients, financial advisors and 
asset managers may not be able to refer products 
that fit the risk/return profiles clients are seeking. 
This is especially true if the advisor’s institution does 
not offer their own product, and where there is less 
incentive to conduct research on external products.
Even where there is awareness of social finance 
among advisors, there remains a gap in the knowl-
edge of available social finance products and their 
track records. This gap in knowledge is particularly 
important as investors generally prefer working with 
the financial advisors they already have a relationship 
with, rather than conducting their own research into 
the financial products available at boutique firms.
GLOBAL TREND: INCREASING 
IMPACT INVESTMENT ACTIVITY
More capital is being directed towards 
(deliberate) impact investing, even if the exact 
magnitude and nature of those flows are 
under debate. The Monitor Institute (Fulton 
& Freireich 2009) stated that the industry 
could grow to $500 billion within 5-10 years, 
representing an estimated 1% of global assets 
under management as of 2008. A survey by 
JP Morgan and the Global Impact Investing 
Network (GIIN) in November 2010 estimated 
a market size of profit potential ranging from 
$183 billion to $667 billion, and invested 
capital in the range of $400 billion to nearly 
$1 trillion (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & Saltuk 
2010). A revised study in December 2011 
surveyed investors representing over 2,200 
private transactions totalling over $4 billion 
of investment, up from 1,000 transactions and 
almost $2.5 billion in the previous 
year (Bouri et al 2011).
3.   The UNPRI is an investor initiative in partnership with the UN Environment Program’s Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact that seeks to help 
institutional investors integrate environmental, social and governance issues into their decision-making.
4.   The CDP is an independent not-for-profit organization that provides companies and investors with a system to measure, disclose, manage and share climate 
change and water information.
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Generally, interview and survey respondents saw 
opportunities in social finance even if they were not 
currently engaged in the field. There is evidence 
that clients – high net worth individuals and retail 
investors, in particular – are expressing more interest 
in the area of social finance and impact investing. 
However, there are few channels to educate clients 
about their options, and this has reinforced the 
challenge of uncovering latent demand for social 
finance products.
FINDING: FEW SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
PRODUCTS ARE AVAILABLE AS 
MAINSTREAM INVESTMENTS
There are few specific product offerings that are 
available as mainstream impact investments in 
Canada. For example, Socially Responsible Investment 
funds are available through a wide range of invest-
ment advisors, though several interviewees noted 
a dearth of options on impact investment products 
(beyond screening).
Clean tech and internationally-oriented microfinance 
are recent additions that are becoming more widely 
available. For advisors and investors there are now a 
number of high-profile institutions that offer options, 
including Desjardins, Vancity, Sustainalytics, Sarona 
Asset Management, and RBC/Phillips Hager & North.
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LANGUAGE & VOCABULARY
There are several different terms that are used 
interchangeably by those in non-profit organizations 
and financial institutions alike. Words like ‘impact’, 
‘sustainability’ or even ‘social’ hold very different 
meanings for those on different sides of the capital 
equation. Generally speaking, those in mainstream 
finance have a tendency to categorize impact invest-
ing into the more familiar realm of socially responsible 
investing (SRI).
There is a debate happening [amongst ourselves] 
between those who feel they have been doing 
impact investing for decades, perhaps under the 
theories of responsible investing, versus those who 
have recently adopted much more critical views on 
what impact actually means.
— Venture Capitalist, Alberta
Furthermore, the misapplication of specific terms with 
established definitions has had a detrimental impact 
when it came to building trust and credibility between 
the social and financial sectors. For example, as ubiqui-
tous as the term ‘donation’ may be amongst charities, 
the term ‘bond’ has equally strict expectations 
amongst the finance community. The Social Impact 
Bond was raised in a number of conversations as a 
misleading label for a product that has no guarantee 
of principle, as traditional bonds do. This is an obstacle 
in reaching Canadian investors who have precise 
expectations on various types of financial products. 
Asset managers expressed concern over recommend-
ing products where the risk or return parameters are 
not explicitly defined, or are inconsistent with existing 
product definitions:
When it comes to new products, there is no 
tolerance for any ambiguity around product 
structure, return expectations and exposure to risk. 
You can’t create a radical new financial product or 
instrument, slap a familiar label on it and expect 
people to not only accept it, but allocate their 
savings towards it. It will only make investors 
more skeptical.
— Asset Manager, Alberta
RECOMMENDATION: 
1. Create symmetry and ensure effective 
communication. Greater sensitivity toward 
terminology with long standing defini-
tions amongst the financial community is 
required, especially if they relate directly to 
risk or return on investment.
2. Those on the demand side of capital 
(non-profits, social enterprises) may benefit 
from becoming more literate in financial 
vernacular and using it in the appropriate 
context (e.g. incorporating financial literacy 
training into the professional development 
tracks of non-profit executives).
CHALLENGES & 
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BOTTLENECK FROM ADVISORS/MANAGERS
Within the ecosystem of capital markets, the relation-
ships between the owners and managers of capital 
take on multiple forms and result in complex mecha-
nisms through which capital flows. Many of these 
mechanisms are highly regulated or operate within 
a rigid framework, which can slow the response to 
changing demands within the investment community.
As noted earlier, awareness among owners of capital 
has resulted in increased consideration of values-
based investing. They are discovering impact invest-
ment opportunities through mainstream channels, 
and the notion that profit-generating opportunities 
can align with their personal philanthropic principles 
is resonating deeply amongst this new breed 
of investors.
These investors include young professionals who tend 
to be more proactive than prior generations with 
regards to financial management as well as to their 
responsibility to society, and large family estates that 
are exploring broader interpretations on how their 
legacy is built. For many investors in this category, 
they can be disincentivized from pursuing these 
objectives when their financial advisor or portfolio 
manager in unable to respond to their requests for 
additional information or products.
There is growing frustration among high-net 
worth individuals, and families, around the lack of 
impact investment expertise in Canadian estate 
planning & advisory services. These investors 
are either being directed away or offered little 
relevant information.
— Private Equity Executive, Ontario
In this regard, front-line professionals represent a key 
component of the financial ecosystem that is not yet 
adequately positioned to mobilize a significant pool 
of private capital from retail investors. This is the 
result of not only insufficient knowledge or incentive 
structures on the part of the advisor, but also from a 
lack of readily accessible products for asset managers 
to easily direct their investors to, with minimum effort 
on their part.
There are a handful of professionals who currently 
specialize in managing SRI products, or more rarely, 
are fuelled by their personal interest in social finance 
and may direct investors to local opportunities or ‘off 
the book’ transactions that bear no benefit to the pro-
fessional. However, their reach pales in comparison to 
the industry at large.
I introduce local investment opportunities to my 
clients and tell them it’s there. But that’s all I 
can do. It cannot be brokered through my firm; 
they cannot have it in their portfolio here. I can’t 
oversee it and I don’t profit from these transac-
tions. But I am willing to do this. Most advisors 
would not be.
— Portfolio Manager, Ontario
Changing the Know Your Client process to mandate 
asking whether clients care about social impact 
would be great, if there were more products 
around to actually fulfill that need when they say 
yes. Advisors need to be educated too, and we 
need a range of products.
— Advisor, Alberta
GLOBAL TREND: LANGUAGE
Many of the impact investors in Canada 
actively supported the social economy long 
before the terminology to categorize their 
activity was developed. The sector faces 
issues around consistent language, and the 
term social finance is not well known or well 
understood by most investors (Harji & Hebb 
2009). In a recent survey conducted by JP 
Morgan and the GIIN, survey respondents 
believed that the number of institutional or 
high net worth individual (“HNWI”) investors 
who “know what impact investing is” has 
doubled since 2009. However, three-quarters 
of respondents would still describe the current 
impact investing market as “in its 
infancy and growing”, rather 
than “about to take off” (19%) 
(Bouri et al 2011).
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Target awareness building and education 
of financial advisors and retail asset 
managers who will be most effective at 
unlocking latent demand among potential 
impact investors. This would support local 
social finance opportunities and enhance 
the value proposition of ‘on the books’ 
products while providing a motive for 
change at the institutional level.
2. Support education and training of 
front-line professionals through existing 
industry associations such as the Social 
Investment Organization, and certification 
programs, such as Concordia University’s 
Sustainability Investment Professional 
Certification (SIPC). Furthermore, such 
education provides resources and trusted 
individuals that other front-line profes-
sionals may refer their clients to.
3. It is worth re-examining the practices 
surrounding client intake and the Know 
Your Client (KYC) protocols performed at 
advisory and asset management firms. 
Very few organizations have distinct lines 
of questioning to capture a client’s social 
or environmental preferences, and how 
they may influence investment prefer-
ences. Clearly, this needs to be supported 
with product availability to adequately 
meet these newly identified needs - how-
ever asking the question is a critical first 
step to understanding the size and type 
of demand.
LIMITED PRODUCT ACCESSIBILITY
Many current impact investment opportunities in 
Canada are primarily targeted at private accredited 
investors, who are partial to local or community 
impact, or at foundations whose missions are 
distinctly aligned with the opportunity itself. This 
is largely because the most accessible investment 
opportunities are in the form of community bonds, 
loans or direct equity investments where the size of 
the investment is far below what may be attractive 
for larger institutional investors to even consider. 
Portfolio managers also expressed concern over their 
ability to meet their fiduciary duty in creating a bal-
anced portfolio with only impact investment products 
available today.
If a client came to me with [too much of] a focus 
on social returns, I would not be confident in my 
ability to provide them a diversified portfolio using 
only these type of funds.
— Financial Advisor, Ontario
Finally, fund managers have cited existing securities 
legislation that limits the portion of illiquid assets 
allowed in a mutual fund portfolio 5 as a key bar-
rier preventing larger investment in social impact 
products. By their nature, community notes, bonds or 
investments into local loan funds are illiquid due to 
their vesting periods but most importantly due to the 
lack of a secondary market for the resale or valua-
tion of these investments. Although investors may 
demand these products, and accept the increased 
risk or reduced liquidity associated with them, this 
regulation prevents them from accessing these assets 
through traditional mutual funds.
As channels of investment demand grow, there will be 
corresponding pressure to create impact investment 
products that are suitable for mainstream distribution 
(for retail or institutional investors). Additionally, 
many portfolio managers would expect that impact 
investment products be allowed status similar to 
existing investment options such as TFSA eligible 
securities or investments.
If the Federal government does not allow [social 
finance products] to be TFSA or RRSP eligible, 
that would reduce the legitimacy of these products 
and reduce the amount of investors who would 
participate. We need to think about Canadians 
investing in Canada.
— Credit Union Manager, Alberta
The Canadian Securities Association needs to 
consider granting social impact fund exemptions 
from the current securities restrictions around the 
value of illiquid investment allowed in a mutual 
fund portfolio. This is the single biggest barrier to 
being able to offer a Canada-wide, social impact 
fund through [our organization].
— Mutual Fund Executive, Ontario
5.   National Instrument 81-102 (2.4) Restrictions Concerning Illiquid Assets.
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RECOMMENDATION:
1. Support the creation of a centralized 
database of active social impact oppor-
tunities provides advisors with easy 
access to accurate information on social 
finance products - and to direct clients 
accordingly. Initiatives like SIO’s directory 
of SRI Funds are great starting points for 
centralising information.
2. Remove barriers for community orga-
nizations to participate in innovative 
financing mechanisms (e.g. Community 
Bonds) to increase the potential pipeline 
of local investment opportunities. 
Advocacy efforts are underway to 
explore hybrid legal structures (such 
as Community Interest Companies and 
Benefit Corporations).
3. Support the development of a National 
Impact Investment Fund to consolidate 
many of the smaller scale, fragmented 
financing products so that they are more 
accessible to mainstream markets. In 
June 2011, the SIO completed its feasibil-
ity study on this National Fund of Funds. 
Efforts are underway to enlist resources 
and support for various sectors to further 
its implementation.
HIGH RISK PERCEPTION
The challenges around risk perception stem from 
a general lack of confidence associated with any 
financial products or investment initiatives where 
the social or environmental mandate appears to 
overshadow, or at a minimum, lessen the importance 
of the profit potential. As a result, there is a natural 
stigma towards non-profit lending, social finance 
or even credit unions’ ability to generate finan-
cial returns.
The prevailing perspective is that social finance 
has stemmed from concessionary capital and 
compromising returns is necessary. They will soon 
realize this is not true once they see performance 
of more funds like [ours] and once investors begin 
to demand more.
— Private Equity Executive, Ontario
These perceptions of risk have been associated with a 
number of factors:
1. Low confidence in the ability of non-profits or 
social enterprises to effectively manage capital. 
In particular, there is negative bias towards those 
who have historically relied on government grants 
or subsidies; there is little confidence that these 
organizations can successfully operate a profit 
maximization strategy;
2. Lack of quality reporting and transparency with 
regards to their financial or operational metrics;
3. Lack of clarity around measuring social metrics 
is especially prevalent amongst investors when 
returns on a particular investment are directly 
calculated based on a pre-determined set of social 
outcomes and results;
4. Insufficient track record of success and ability to 
yield competitive returns;
5. Liquidity risk, even on securitized investments, 
in that it is unlikely to be morally acceptable for 
a lender or investor to foreclose on property or 
exercise a claim on assets used to carry out a 
social mission; and similarly,
6. High reputational risk associated with investing in 
this sector as these investments tend to generate 
greater levels of public interest and scrutiny.
GLOBAL TREND: 
PRODUCT ACCESSIBILITY
Access to reliable, accurate information on 
viable investment opportunities remains 
one of the key issues for impact investors. A 
recent JP Morgan survey cites the lack of a 
track record of successful investments and a 
shortage of quality investment opportunities 
as the top two challenges to industry growth 
(Saltuk et al., 2011b). Search costs are high as 
“investment ready” opportunities are difficult 
to find, and the costs of due diligence can be 
prohibitively high for early-stage 
investments that require a rela-
tively small amount of capital.
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The myth that co-ops and socially-minded 
organizations are for some reason a greater risk 
to the financial community than standard start-up 
businesses needs to stop. The statistics will tell 
you an entirely different story. They are in fact a 
far lower risk, have far fewer delinquencies and are 
far better able to weather the storms than start-up 
organizations that don’t have that.
— Credit Union, Alberta
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Equip prospective investees with tools nec-
essary to effectively monitor, understand 
and report financial as well as operational 
metrics. Non-profits and social enterprises 
may need to upgrade their financial 
reporting and monitoring strategies so 
as to generate the type of comparative 
information potential investors expect to 
see in for-profit companies.
2. Embedded executives have proven to 
be a very successful and cost effective 
model for integrating business expertise 
and capacity into organizations that don’t 
currently have, or cannot afford these 
resources on a permanent basis.6 
3. Equip investors and intermediaries with 
tools to evaluate the risk and perfor-
mance of social finance products. The 
due diligence process of a non-profit or 
social enterprise may vary slightly from 
traditional methods, as the indicators of 
success may not be as obvious. Reference 
guides, like the Social Enterprise 
Analytical Model, published by the 
Chantier de L’Économie Sociale in Quebec, 
are a good starting point.
4. Educate the future generation of business 
leaders by integrating multi-dimensional 
risk assessment and impact investing 
principles into post-secondary and gradu-
ate programs.
There are really good co-ops and co-ops that are 
not as good, but this is the same for [for-profit] 
companies too. It is really a matter of how good 
the governance is... it may take longer for a co-op 
to reach maturity, but once it has we expect the 
same kind of risk.
— Private Equity, Quebec
GLOBAL TREND: RISK/RETURN/
IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS
Valuation of risk and return in social finance 
is still an emerging industry, as it is in many 
other parts of the world. Consequently, there 
is inconsistent use of language and a “chal-
lenge to build a lexicon of valuation” (Emerson 
2003). Even a brief examination of some 
valuation methods indicates that there is no 
unilaterally accepted approach, let alone a 
single metric, to social impact measurement 
or the blended value that is created by all 
investments (Olsen and Galimidi 2008, Tuan 
2008). Individuals vary in their expectations 
of impact and thus need to be addressed 
accordingly (Duncan & Wong 2010; Moon 
2010). Standards and benchmarks for deter-
mining non-financial performance have yet to 
be widely adopted. Therefore investors must 
often rely on their own judgment to assess the 
impact being made (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud 
& Saltuk 2010). Measurements of social impact 
are often difficult to establish and are largely 
anecdotal (Geobey, Westley & Weber 2011; 
O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & Saltuk 2010). In 
the absence of performance benchmarks, 
investors have difficulty comparing the social 
performance of their investments against one 
another and as a result there is little con-
sistent quantitative data about the 
social impact actually achieved 
(Bugg-Levine & Goldstein 2009).
6.  Examples include the embedded executive program curated by MaRS Discovery District via the provincially funded Business Mentorship & Entrepreneurship 
Program. Similarly, the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) offers financial support and ‘consulting’ services for innovative new start-ups. The 
Canadian Youth Business Foundation loan recipients are required to work with a business mentor for the duration of their loan – the mentor is assigned by the 
foundation and ranges from seasoned executives to successful entrepreneurs.
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN 
CAPITAL MARKETS
Government initiatives that aim to directly manipu-
late or influence the flow of investment are generally 
seen as intrusive, and were perceived negatively 
amongst those participating in this study. Some 
respondents described attempts to attract investors 
via tax incentives or similar one-dimensional efforts 
as unsustainable or even irresponsible. Many partici-
pants cited their experience with labour sponsored 
venture capital funds as the source of their apprehen-
sion, where others had less specific macroeconomic 
concerns towards government subsidy or interven-
tion.7  For example, many believe that tax incentives 
fail to serve the long-term growth potential of a 
particular market segment by creating a dependency 
on incentives to attract capital, rather than the merits 
of a carefully conducted investment evaluation.
Finally, with regard to government intervention 
in social financing activities, some participants 
expressed concern over the long-term implications 
of increased private sector involvement in what 
were previously public sector responsibilities. Asset 
managers forewarned of the criticism they would 
expect from clients, if indeed a new product was 
introduced that funded a social service, especially 
when the pay-off or returns associated with these 
products are not clearly understood. Similarly, asset 
managers acknowledged that initiatives where clients 
feel that government is relinquishing their public 
sector responsibilities will be met with skepticism that 
may become a barrier to mainstream adoption.
As with any paradigm shift, people need to 
get used to new products and risk factors. 
Governments stepping in and providing a cushion 
during this process is pivotal - however it must be 
done responsibly. Investors need encouragement 
to navigate risks and rewards, not temporary lures 
or incentives that lead to misguided placements 
of capital.
— Portfolio Manager, Ontario
Our biggest macro-risk is [the impact of] 
government intervention in markets from fiscal 
indebtedness… [such as by] attempting to 
grow tax intakes… and how this translates into 
monetary and financial repression - that is, holding 
bonds and keeping interest rates low - these are 
our biggest challenges.
- Pension Fund, Quebec
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. There is a case for government interven-
tion, particularly around legitimizing social 
finance products, however the challenge 
is in how much and where. The role of 
government should be to mitigate short-
term risk in order to create long-term 
sustainability, rather than simply to attract 
temporary infusions of capital toward 
certain initiatives.
2. There are various proposals for govern-
ment support circulating within the 
social finance community that attempt to 
address both the immediate need for capi-
tal as well as the long-term sustainability 
of an asset class or market segment. Some 
of these are:
a. First loss capital guarantees provided 
by the government would provide 
risk mitigation to structured funds 
that contribute to impact invest-
ment objectives.
b. Supporting intermediaries (i.e. 
subsidizing staff, administration, legal 
costs etc.) or new funds, reduces the 
transaction costs associated with 
impact investing without skewing the 
risk/reward valuations associated 
with the investment itself.
7.  Recognizing that the social economy in Quebec is notably more developed than in the rest of Canada, it was expected that there would be significantly differ-
ent views on the role of government in directing the evolution of a social economy.
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IMPACT INVESTING AS AN ASSET CLASS
Many respondents advocated for the maturation 
of impact investing to the point where its products 
represent a unique asset class of their own. Although 
this may be an intermediary step towards a necessary 
evolution of capital markets, participants expressed 
concern that pushing impact investments into their 
own asset class will marginalize their underlying 
principles, thus limiting its adoption into mainstream 
investment markets.
Branding a particular investment strategy as ‘social’ 
or ‘impact-based’ may reach a target market of values 
driven investors and raise awareness and capital 
towards certain social causes. However, several 
participants active in the SRI space feel strongly that 
advocating for the development of these niche invest-
ments may distract from existing strategies that aim 
to incorporate SRI principles more broadly across all 
asset classes and business activities.
Is impact investing an asset class? In some ways 
it is a little like the term cleantech. There are clean 
technology investors who invest in start-up equity, 
there are cleantech investors who invest in growth 
equity, there are cleantech investors who provide 
debt at an institutional level to renewable energy 
programs, and there are public companies with 
publicly traded debt and shares. It is something 
that cuts all the way across, but there is a bit of a 
theme to it.
— Credit Union, British Columbia
We are concerned about the potential negative 
impact that ‘impact investment’ may have on the 
SRI industry as a whole. It is possible that ‘impact 
investment’ may take away some of SRI’s steam 
(resources) to push some of the largest corpora-
tions towards enhanced social and environmental 
performance. For example, are the social and 
environmental benefits of a small organic juice 
company more ‘impactful’ than moving Coca-Cola 
towards enhanced CSR practices?
— Investment Fund, British Columbia
  
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. For many, the ultimate goal of impact 
investing is to direct capital towards 
addressing some of the most pressing 
social and environmental challenges. For 
others, it represents a paradigm shift in 
the role of business and what it means to 
create value. A challenge occurs when the 
pursuit of one goal may distract or conflict 
with efforts of another. Ultimately, impact 
investing requires a holistic approach 
towards market development that 
simultaneously addresses the immediate 
need for capital deployment as well as 
broader macroeconomic objectives. This 
includes supporting:
a. Mechanisms and infrastructure to 
channel investment capital into social 
enterprises and non-profits. This 
includes creation of new financial 
products, education programs, 
and evaluation methods and most 
importantly, requires finding middle 
ground between the social and 
financial sectors, recognizing that 
compromises will need to be made.
b. Systems level changes to existing 
business mentality and definitions 
of value creation. For example, this 
occurs as organizations expand their 
responsibility towards a broader 
stakeholder base and the negative 
externalities that affect them. This 
must come organically, from within 
organizations; however, legislative 
innovations and other supports 
can be established to facilitate 
this process.
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FIDUCIARY DUTY
The most common challenge to impact investing, as 
cited by fund managers or institutional investors, is 
their fiduciary responsibility to protect the invest-
ment of their clients or investors.
The mandates of institutional investors, especially 
pensions, are strictly regulated and many cite this 
rigidity as reason for not being able to consider 
impact investments where the financial risk is 
unfamiliar. Asset managers are expected and legally 
obligated to conduct their activities in a way that 
maximizes returns for their clients. In the absence 
of a strong record of success or proven financial 
sustainability, it can be challenging to provide a sound 
rationale for exploring social finance strategies.
If a pension plan believes supporting a particular 
social cause was a worthwhile thing to do...then 
they might very well have a dual mandate. But 
unless someone provides me with a dual mandate 
I’m not interested in it and, in fact, it would be 
irresponsible of me to pursue a dual mandate.
— Venture Capital Manager, Ontario
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Provide clarity to institutional investors 
on their fiduciary obligations, in a manner 
that is consistent with their existing prin-
ciples. For example, there are now several 
legal interpretations (such as Freshfields II 
and the UNPRI) of fiduciary responsibility 
that allow for the consideration of a wider 
set of stakeholder interests, beyond a nar-
row focus on maximizing financial return.
2. In the current environment, there are 
several ways to fit impact investment in 
the context of fiduciary responsibility. 
These include:
a. Understanding fiduciary duty as 
an intergenerational task. In order 
to preserve future prosperity and 
existing standards of living, a 
concerted effort is required to build 
economic and business models that 
capture broader assessments of risk 
and value.
a. Proving that impact investment 
products and vehicles are able to 
generate market-competitive returns 
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As this report has noted repeatedly, and as has been 
referred to in other publications (Task Force 2010, 
Harji and Hebb 2009), there is a breadth of existing 
social finance activity across the country. Canada’s 
credit union sector has, and continues to be, a key 
driver of social finance activity. Several recent 
announcements such as the establishment of the 
MaRS Centre for Impact Investing and the RBC Impact 
Investing Fund provide positive signals for further 
evolution of this nascent marketplace.
This report identified the key issues related to the 
awareness of social finance among the financial 
sector, to identify gaps in knowledge and barriers to 
investment, and to propose strategies and recommen-
dations to catalyze awareness and activity in social 
finance by the financial sector. Through primary and 
secondary data collection and analysis, this report 
provided new insights into the issues and opportuni-
ties around social finance among the general financial 
sector across Canada.
In addition to our recommendations to address these 
issues, there is an emerging set of activity around 
social finance across Canada that can be leveraged 
and built upon. It is our expectation that the process 
of identifying and engaging individuals and institu-
tions in this study, as well as the publication of this 
report, will itself contribute to increased awareness 
and adoption of social finance among the finance sec-
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INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Social finance 8 is the deliberate, intentional applica-
tion of tools, instruments, and strategies to enable 
capital to achieve a social, environmental, and 
financial return (Harji & Hebb 2009). Organizations 
that receive such investment can be found in the non-
profit and for-profit sectors or in the hybrid space 
between them, they are mission-driven and seek to 
maximize blended value. Essentially, social finance 
addresses three separate but interconnected aspects 
of what we call the social capital market – the supply 
of capital searching for that “blended value” return, 
the demand for that capital, and the intermediaries 
that link the two (Harji 2009).
Investors are becoming increasingly concerned 
about the placement of their investments and not 
exclusively with their return on investments (JP 
Morgan 2010). Impact investments have the poten-
tial to complement philanthropy and government 
intervention as a potent force for addressing global 
challenges; they actively seek to place capital in 
businesses and funds that can provide solutions at 
a scale that philanthropic intervention alone cannot 
reach (Fulton & Freireich 2009). The impact invest-
ment philosophy unlocks substantial capital to build a 
more sustainable and equitable global economy while 
allowing for diversification across geographies and 
asset classes (Palandjian 2010).
More capital is being directed towards (deliberate) 
impact investing, even if the exact magnitude and 
nature of those flows are under debate. The Monitor 
Institute (Fulton & Freireich 2009) stated that the 
industry could grow to $500 billion within 5-10 years, 
representing an estimated 1% of global assets under 
management as at 2008. A survey by JP Morgan 
and the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) in 
November 2010 estimated a market size of profit 
potential ranging from $183 billion to $667 billion, 
and invested capital in the range of $400 billion to 
nearly $1 trillion (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & Saltuk 
2010). A revised study in December 2011 surveyed 
investors representing over 2,200 private transac-
tions totalling over $4 billion of investment, up from 
1,000 transactions and almost $2.5 billion in the 
previous year, respectively (Bouri et al 2011).
SOCIAL FINANCE IN CANADA
Social finance in Canada is at a nascent stage of 
development, and can be characterized as “uncoor-
dinated innovation”, where disparate entrepreneurial 
activities and business model innovations occur 
in response to market needs or policy incentives 
(Fulton & Freireich 2009). The Canadian Task Force 
on Social Finance (2010) has estimated that impact 
investments could yield $30 billion for investment in 
social enterprises and more sustainable community 
organizations (2010), and the Social Investment 
Organization has identified $4.45 billion in impact 
investments (Bragg 2010). Despite this potential, 
impact investing in Canada has been slow to material-
ize (Jagelewski 2011).
Government, at both the federal and provincial levels, 
has been the primary source of social finance in 
Canada – particularly through grants and contribu-
tions, as well as operating and program subsidies. 
(Hebb 2006; Cameron 2003). At the provincial level, 
Quebec has been a leader in social finance through 
targeted programs, dedicated financing vehicles and 
capital pools, and an enabling regulatory environment 
(Mendell & Nogales 2008; Strandberg 2006). As well 
as funding programs and projects directly, govern-
ment has often funded social initiatives indirectly 
through intermediaries (Hebb 2006).
More recently, there has been increased interest 
among foundations to utilize the full range of their 
assets to achieve their social objectives (Godeke 
and Pomeres, 2009). Several progressive Canadian 
foundations have already used program-related 
investments (PRIs) to invest in social enterprise and 
nonprofit property investments (Strandberg 2008). 
These efforts are occurring against a backdrop of 
interest across the country: the Centre for Impact 
Investing was recently established in Toronto at the 
MaRS Discovery District, and nascent policy initiatives 
to stimulate social enterprise have been initiated in 
British Columbia and Nova Scotia.
Despite these positive trends, Canada’s social sector 
remains undercapitalized relative to the needs and 
pressures placed on it, and only a small percent-
age of finance is “invested with intent” to fill this 
gap (Strandberg 2007; Mendell & Nogales 2008). 
APPENDIX: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT ON 
SOCIAL FINANCE AND IMPACT INVESTING
8.  Note: we use the terms ‘social finance’ and ‘impact investing’ interchangeably for the purposes of this report.
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Canada’s nonprofit and voluntary sector is the second 
largest in the world (Hall et al. 2005), and several 
estimates of social enterprise activity across Canada 
suggest growth in the sector (Brouard et al. 2008; 
Pearson 2008). As it currently stands, there is a 
shortage of funding for social enterprises making it 
an inefficient and uncoordinated market (Malhotra, 
Laird, Spence 2010).
DEMAND FOR SOCIAL FINANCE
Since the 1970s, crises in the welfare state, interna-
tional development, market structures and in state 
socialism have highlighted the weaknesses of both 
for-profit and public approaches to problem-solving 
on their own (Salamon 1994). At the same time, 
traditional non-profits have learned that commercial 
initiatives aligned with their social missions could 
provide an additional means of making an impact and 
diversifying revenue streams (Weisbrod 1998; James 
and Young 2007). This has led to the development of 
social enterprises seeking to combine both social and 
profit generation in a single organization (Ridley-Duff 
& Bull 2011).
Overall, this has resulted in a shift towards bringing 
the social sector into the centre of public policy 
attention, an increase in its scope, and an increase 
in its scale (Helmut & Salamon 2006). Social sector 
institutions receive grants and donations from indi-
viduals who do not benefit directly from the resulting 
social and environmental benefits. However, attempts 
at commercializing social sector activity has caused 
concern over mission drift, leading to the erosion of 
public trust in these organizations and the sector as 
a whole (Weisbrod 1998). Traditionally there has been 
little capacity for those providing funds to the social 
sector to be able to monitor performance, so the non-
profit legal framework has served as a check against 
profit-taking (Hansmann 1980).
The non-profit sector itself has traditionally faced 
constraints that the for-profit and public sectors do 
not face. Salamon notes that the non-profit sector 
is prone to failures due to insufficient resources and 
narrowness of interest (1987), which can be partially 
attributed to lack of access to capital (Hansmann 
1980). In accumulating capital for social purposes, 
the structure of Canada’s investment industry is 
divided: philanthropy on one end of the financing 
spectrum and profit-maximization at the other (Harji 
2009). Canada’s existing tax, legal and regulatory 
frameworks have been developed over generations 
in support of this bifurcated system, making it 
ill-conducive to establishing the impact investing 
mechanisms necessary to coordinate the marketplace 
(Task Force 2010).
For example, a charity is only permitted to conduct 
business related to its expressed charitable purpose, 
thereby restricting the types of revenue-generating 
activities in which it may engage (PH&N, 2010). As a 
result, charitable status may be too restrictive for a 
social entrepreneur, who needs to generate alterna-
tive sources of revenue in funding their initiatives, yet 
incorporating as a for-profit eliminates the enterprise 
from qualifying for grant funding that may be neces-
sary during the critical early stages of development.
Social economy organizations serve different pur-
poses than for-profit and public organizations and, 
consequently, have different organizational needs. 
Businesses, unlike donation-based non-profits, have 
a one dimensional profit maximization objective, 
and can gauge the success of services through 
revenue-generation. They are able to clearly identify 
their customers and owners, and tend to have a 
more stable and predictable cash flow. This last point 
also means that donation based non-profits have 
higher relative needs for liquidity than similar-sized 
for-profits (Zeitlow, Hankin & Seidner 2007; Bowman 
2007). Diversification of revenue streams can reduce 
this instability somewhat (Young 2007b), however, the 
lack of future profits as collateral for debt (Yetman 
2007) or the option of equity investments, restricts 
the fundraising needed to develop those diverse 
revenue streams.
INVESTOR ENGAGEMENT
Impact investors can be segmented into two 
categories based on their investment objectives: 
impact-first, where achieving social or environmental 
good are the primary target, even if at the expense 
of financial return, and financial-first investors who 
often seek market rate returns but have an appetite 
for social or environmental value drives (Fulton & 
Freireich 2009). Each of these types of investors 
exist across various asset classes ranging from cash 
deposits to alternative instruments such as real 
estate or venture capital (PH&N 2010).
Many of the impact investors in Canada have been 
actively supporting the social economy long before 
the terminology to categorize their activity was even 
developed. The sector faces issues around consistent 
language, and the term social finance is not well 
known or well understood by most investors (Harji 
& Hebb 2009). In a recent survey conducted by JP 
Morgan and the GIIN, survey respondents believe 
that the number of random institutional or high net 
worth individual (“HNWI”) investors who “know what 
impact investing is” has doubled since 2009. However, 
three-quarters of respondents would still describe the 
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current impact investing market as “in its infancy and 
growing”, rather than “about to take off” (19%) 
(Bouri et al 2011).
Valuation of risk and return in social finance is still 
an emerging industry, as it is in many other parts of 
the world. Along with this follows the inconsistent use 
of language and the “challenge to build a lexicon of 
valuation” (Emerson 2003). Even a brief examination 
of a subset of the available methods indicates that 
there is no unilaterally accepted approach, let alone 
a single metric, to social impact measurement or 
the blended value that is created by all investments 
(Olsen and Galimidi 2008, Tuan 2008). Individuals 
vary in their expectations of impact and thus need 
to be addressed accordingly (Duncan & Wong 2010; 
Moon 2010). Standards and benchmarks for deter-
mining non-financial performance have yet to be 
widely adopted; therefore investors must often rely 
on their own judgment to assess the impact being 
made (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & Saltuk 2010). 
Measurements of social impact are often difficult to 
establish and are largely anecdotal (Geobey, Westley 
& Weber 2011; O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud & Saltuk 
2010). In the absence of performance benchmarks, 
investors have difficulty comparing the social perfor-
mance of their investments against one another and 
as a result there is little consistent quantitative data 
about the social impact actually achieved (Bugg-
Levine & Goldstein 2009).
Recently, efforts have been made to establish a 
common rating system. The GIIN created its Impact 
Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) to provide 
a common framework for defining, tracking and 
reporting on the performance of impact investments. 
IRIS provides an independent set of metrics for 
organizations to use when reporting their impact 
and aims to increase the value of non-financial data 
by enabling performance comparisons and bench-
marking (GIIN 2010). The Global Impact Investment 
Ratings System (GIIRS) is based on the IRIS taxonomy 
and reporting standard. It aims to assess the social 
and environmental impact (but not the financial 
performance) of companies and funds using a ratings 
approach analogous to Morningstar investment 
rankings or S&P credit risk ratings (B Lab 2010). While 
these ratings systems are being embraced by the 
impact investing community, the industry “remains 
beset by inefficiencies and distortions that currently 
limit its impact.” (Bugg-Levine & Goldstein 2009).
Access to reliable, accurate information on viable 
investment opportunities remains one of the key 
issues for impact investors. The lack of a track record 
of successful investments, and a shortage of quality 
investment opportunities rank as the top two chal-
lenges to industry growth in the recent JP Morgan 
survey, with inadequate impact measurement practice 
coming in third (Saltuk et al., 2011b). Search costs are 
high as “investment ready” opportunities are difficult, 
and the costs of due diligence can be prohibitively 
high for early-stage investments that require rela-
tively small amounts of capital.
INTERMEDIATION CHALLENGES
A lack of intermediation is at the forefront of the 
challenges facing impact investment (Ayton & 
Sarver 2006; Emerson & Bonini 2003; Harji & Hebb 
2009). Sophisticated intermediaries are essential to 
address many of the risks noted above; they match 
available financial products to the specific needs of 
investors. These intermediaries provide meaningful 
information to the market in order to overcome the 
systemic information asymmetry that reinforces this 
uncoordinated state (Bugg-Levine & Goldstein 2009). 
The dearth of intermediaries has been attributed to 
the relatively new existence of an impact investment 
marketplace and the smaller scale of deal making 
opportunities; economic incentives for intermediaries 
have not been sufficient to attract new intermediaries 
to the sector (Emerson & Spitzer 2007).
Intermediaries need reach a certain level of sophis-
tication in order to identify potential partners and 
structure creative deals that blend the various risk 
and reward expectations of investors in a relatively 
seamless manner (Harji 2009). Without intermediar-
ies, impact investors are not able to calibrate risk and 
opportunity adequately, therefore limiting the amount 
of capital injected into the social economy (Harji 
& Hebb 2009; Hope Consulting 2010). Conversely, 
social ventures are in need of capital and the lack of 
intermediaries acts as a barrier to the growth, suc-
cess and operation of everyday business (Malhotra, 
Laird, Spence 2010). The supply of capital does not 
correspond to the needs of social enterprises and 
as it currently stands, there is a significant misalign-
ment between the demand and supply sides of social 
finance (Harji & Hebb 2010; Mendell & Nogales 2008).
Unlike in the private sector, there is an absence of a 
well-functioning “capital curve” for social businesses 
that matches the right kind of capital to the best 
prospects for profitability (Bishop & Green 2010). 
Different classes of investors can layer their capital 
at various stages in order to create a “blended 
capital curve” corresponding to several risk, return 
and impact combinations. For example, impact-first 
investors such as venture philanthropists can provide 
early-stage finance that delivers low financial returns 
and high risk but offers desirable social returns. 
Government provides a combination of capital (such 
as grant-funded TA, below-market debt) that can 
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scale up proven ideas, and finance-first investors can 
provide larger investments at even greater scale. 
Bridge financing in between these stages can be 
made more efficient through better coordination from 
investors, and feasible possibilities include phased 
investing (baton pass), co-investing, and internal 
horizontal syndication (Kohler et al, 2011).
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
While impact investing denotes a natural inclination 
to the financial markets, the role of government has 
been critical – even in the financial markets, as we 
have witnessed over the last few years. Learning 
from the United Kingdom in particular, we have a set 
of markers around ways in which government can 
engage directly or indirectly in social finance, and the 
results and unintended consequences (HM Treasury 
2011; Joy et al 2011). Beyond these countries, we have 
witnessed an array of approaches that can create an 
enabling environment for impact investing, and many 
of these initiatives can and have stretched beyond 
funding (Thornley & Wood 2011). All these trends 
are occurring within a set of broader structural, 
economic, political, and social changes occurring at 
a tremendous pace, and all of which are important 
contributors to this movement.
In a period of global fiscal constraint, impact invest-
ments can complement government services and 
attract private investment capital, providing greater 
opportunity to implement public-private partnerships 
and outcomes-based finance (Saltuk 2011a). Policy 
and regulation are helping to catalyze impact invest-
ment activity in several jurisdictions globally, across a 
range of sectors (Thornley & Wood 2011). With finan-
cial constraints, the role of the state may not neces-
sarily be diminished – though this could be the case 
in some regions, presenting both a set of challenges 
as well as opportunities – instead, governments will 
be more likely to use the other levers at their disposal 
apart from direct funding. Policy intervention can 
include: increasing the amount of capital for invest-
ment (supply development); increasing the availability 
or strengthening the capacity of capital recipients 
(demand development); or adjusting terms of trade, 
market norms, or prices (directing capital) (Thornley 
& Wood 2011).
Regulation and legislation have presented consider-
able barriers to the development of social finance 
in Canada. The existing legal infrastructure can be 
described as a “patchwork”, with inconsistent and 
inadequate relevant legislative and regulatory sys-
tems (Bridge 2009:3). The Canada Revenue Agency 
takes a very conservative view of charitable activity, 
which discourages innovation in financial instruments 
and tools to leverage the full range of foundation 
assets towards achieving their mission (Strandberg 
2008). Social enterprises, despite their increasing 
popularity, still face significant barriers in accessing 
finance due to the lack of enabling infrastructure – 
especially the limitations imposed through their legal 
status (Mendell 2008, Carter and Man 2008, Bridge 
and Corriveau 2009).
TABLE 1: IMPACT INVESTMENT ASSETS 
AND AMOUNT OF ASSETS 
Source: Social Investment Organization (Bragg 2010)
Impact Investments Assets by Category Assets (millions)
Aboriginal Funds 285.7
Community Futures Development Corporations 910.6
Community Loan Funds and Social Venture Capital 348.8
Credit Unions 951.5
Foundations 32.0
International Impact Investments 5.6
Quebec – Development Capital 1,049.1
Quebec – Solidarity Finance 850.5
Total 4,447.8
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TABLE 2: INVESTOR INITIATIVES BY ASSET CLASS 
Adapted from: Phillips, Hager & North (2010), Task Force (2010)










ES CASH   Vancity deposit products
DEBT   Ottawa Community 
Loan Fund
  Insurance Corporation 
of BC
  Central One
  Credit Union of BC
  Jubilee Fund
  Social Capital Partners
  Edmonton Special 
Enterprise Fund




  Société de capital de risque 
autochtone du Québec 
(SOCARIAQ)

















TS VENTURE CAPITAL   Vancity Capital Corporation
  Emerald Ventures
  Chrysalix Clean Energy 
Tech Fund
  Chantier de l’Économie 
Sociale 
PRIVATE/GROWTH   Cape Fund 
  Investeco
REAL ESTATE   Alterna Community Alliance
  Housing Fund
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(University of Toronto) schools. 
Purpose Capital helps to develop investment 
strategies that matter to the world. 
Purpose Capital supports investors and advisors in 
building strategies that align their investments with 
their social and environmental impact objectives. 
We inform investors and advisors on the key 
opportunities and issues related to these types 
of investments, advise them on the design and 
implementation of impact investment strategies, 
and offer approaches to measure and report on 
social impact.
Purpose Capital is a division of Venture Deli.
Venture Deli accelerates the development of 
promising early-growth companies across a variety 
of sectors by helping to strengthen their business 















































































The  questions  of  this  survey  focus  on  how  asset  management  companies,  lenders  and  investors  provide  capital  for  non-­profits  and  social  enterprises  
in  Canada.  Participation  in  this  study  is  voluntary.  You  may  decline  to  answer  any  questions  that  you  do  not  wish  to  answer  and  you  can  withdraw  
your  participation  at  any  time  by  not  submitting  your  responses.  There  are  no  known  or  anticipated  risks  from  participating  in  this  study,  and  we  
anticipate  the  survey  will  take  about  20  minutes  to  complete.  
It  is  important  for  you  to  know  that  any  information  that  you  provide  will  be  confidential.  All  of  the  data  will  be  summarized  and  no  individual  could  
be  identified  from  these  summarized  results.  Furthermore,  the  web  site  is  programmed  to  collect  responses  alone  and  will  not  collect  any  
information  that  could  potentially  identify  you  (such  as  machine  identifiers).  
Thank  you  for  your  participation  in  this  survey  on  investment  practices.  Social  finance  is  an  approach  to  managing  money  that  delivers  social  
and/or  environmental  benefits,  and  in  most  cases,  a  financial  return,  although  not  necessarily  so.  Social  finance  encourages  positive  social  or  
environmental  solutions  at  a  scale  that  neither  purely  philanthropic  supports  nor  traditional  investment  can  achieve.  
  
As  an  additional  definitional  point,  we  note  the  four  categories  we  use  are:  
•  For-­profit  organizations  are  companies  whose  primary  purpose  is  to  generate  income.  Most  sole  proprietorships,  partnerships  and  corporations  
would  fit  the  definition  of  for-­profit  we  are  using.  
•  Non-­profit/charitable  are  non-­governmental  organizations  whose  primary  purpose  is  to  provide  a  public  service.  This  includes  most  non-­profit  
corporations,  including  both  those  with  and  those  without  charitable  status.  For  the  purposes  of  this  survey  we  shall  also  include  trade  unions  and  
professional  associations.    
•  Public  sector  organizations  are  agencies  which  provide  public  goods  that  are  largely  paid  for  through  tax  revenues.  This  includes  the  Canadian  
government,  provincial  governments  and  municipal  governments.  For  the  purposes  of  this  survey  we  shall  also  include  colleges,  universities,  
hospitals,  regional  health  authorities  and  school  boards.  
•  Social  enterprises  are  revenue-­generating  organizations  that  exist  to  primarily  serve  a  social  purpose.  Unlike  for-­profit,  non-­profit/charitable  and  
public  sector  organizations,  there  are  currently  no  social  enterprise  legal  forms  in  Canada.  Social  enterprises  are  likely  to  be  for-­profit  businesses  
with  a  primarily  social  mandate  or  a  revenue-­generating  unit  within  a  non-­profit  organization.  For  the  purposes  of  this  survey  we  shall  include  all  
cooperatives  as  social  enterprises.  
1. For the purposes of survey administration can you provide us with your email? This 
address will not be tied to your answer, but will be used to ensure we do not send follow-­









2. Our organization is a 
3. What percentage of your portfolio funds are allocated to each of the following? This 
question is to help us develop a sense of your investment focus. 
0% 1-­10% 11-­20% 21-­30% 31-­40% 41-­50% 51-­60% 61-­70% 71-­80% 81-­90% 91-­100% N/A
For-­profit  organizations            
Social  enterprise  
organizations
           
Non-­profit  &  charitable  
organizations
           
Public  sector  organizations            



























































4. Which of the following products are currently being used in order to finance for-­profit, 
social enterprise, non-­profit/charitable and public sector organizations in your portfolio 
(check all that apply): 
For-­profit Social  enterprise Non-­profit  /  charitable Public  sector
Loans  (General)    
Loans  (secured)    
Loans  (unsecured)    
Loans  (subordinate)    
Loans  (below-­market  
interest)
   
Mortgages    
Lines  of  credit    
Working  capital    
Leases    
Equity    
Guarantees    
Bonds    
Grants    
Donations    
  







Now,  could  you  provide  as  with  some  information  about  the  characteristics  of  the  organizations  and  enterprises  that  you  are  financing?  
5. As a percentage of our entire for-­profit portfolio of investments, the for-­profit 
organizations we fund are: 
6. As a percentage of our entire social enterprise portfolio of investments, the social 
enterprises we fund are: 
  
0% 1-­20% 21-­40% 41-­60% 61-­80% 81-­100% N/A
Start-­up  organizations  Spin-­
offs  of  larger  organizations
      
Existing  micro  organizations  
(<4  employees)
      
Existing  small  organizations  
(5-­49  employees)
      
Existing  medium  
organizations  (50-­499)
      
Existing  large  organizations  
(>500)
      
Other       
0% 1-­20% 21-­40% 41-­60% 61-­80% 81-­100% N/A
Start-­up  organizations  Spin-­
offs  of  larger  organizations
      
Existing  micro  organizations  
(<4  employees)
      
Existing  small  organizations  
(5-­49  employees)
      
Existing  medium  
organizations  (50-­499)
      
Existing  large  organizations  
(>500)
      





7. As a percentage of our entire non-­profit and charitable portfolio of investments, the non-­
profit and charitable organizations we provide loans to are: 
8. As a percentage of our entire non-­profit and charitable portfolio of investments, the non-­
profit and charitable organizations we provide grants to are: 
9. As a percentage of public sector organizations in our portfolio of investments, the 
public sector organizations we fund are: 
0% 1-­20% 21-­40% 41-­60% 61-­80% 81-­100% N/A
Start-­up  organizations  Spin-­
offs  of  larger  organizations
      
Existing  micro  organizations  
(<4  employees)
      
Existing  small  organizations  
(5-­49  employees)
      
Existing  medium  
organizations  (50-­499)
      
Existing  large  organizations  
(>500)
      
Other       
0% 1-­20% 21-­40% 41-­60% 61-­80% 81-­100% N/A
Start-­up  organizations  Spin-­
offs  of  larger  organizations
      
Existing  micro  organizations  
(<4  employees)
      
Existing  small  organizations  
(5-­49  employees)
      
Existing  medium  
organizations  (50-­499)
      
Existing  large  organizations  
(>500)
      
Other       
0% 1-­20% 21-­40% 41-­60% 61-­80% 81-­100% N/A
Start-­up  organizations  Spin-­
offs  of  larger  organizations
      
Existing  micro  organizations  
(<4  employees)
      
Existing  small  organizations  
(5-­49  employees)
      
Existing  medium  
organizations  (50-­499)
      
Existing  large  organizations  
(>500)
      






We  would  like  to  get  a  sense  of  the  severity  of  the  risks  as  they  apply  to  funding  for-­profit  organisations,  social  enterprises,  non-­profit  organisations  
and  public  sector  organisations.  
10. How severe do you consider the financial risk as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
11. How do you consider potential financial returns as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
12. How severe do you consider management risk as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
  
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      








13. How severe do you consider public relations risks as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
14. How severe do you consider ethical risks as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
15. How severe do you consider overall inefficiency as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
16. How severe do you consider the risk of low fidelity to mission as it applies to different 
kinds of organizations? 
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









17. How high are cost structures as they apply to different kinds of organizations? 
18. How severe is poor governance as it applies to different kinds of organizations? 
19. How severe is poor access to capital as it applies to different kinds of organizations? 
20. How severe is poor access to securities as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









21. How severe is revenue uncertainty as it applies to different kinds of organizations? 
22. How severe is low accountability to stakeholders as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
23. How severe is the risk of too little liquidity as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
24. How likely are organizations to be too small to be effective as it applies to different 
kinds of organizations? 
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









25. How severe are the burdens of tax regulation as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
26. How severe are the burdens of financial regulation as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
27. How severe are other regulatory burdens as they apply to different kinds of 
organizations? 
28. How severe is the lack of relevant academic expertise as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









29. How severe is the lack of financial community sophistication as it applies to different 
kinds of organizations? 
30. How severe is the lack of financial community networks as they apply to different kinds 
of organizations? 
31. How severe is the lack of expertise in managing credit as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
32. How severe is the lack of available investment advisors as it applies to different kinds 
of organizations? 
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









33. How severe is an over-­reliance on public sector funding as it applies to different kinds 
of organizations? 
34. How severe is an over-­reliance on tax incentives as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
35. How severe is founder/leader domination as it applies to different kinds of 
organizations? 
We're  nearly  there  -­  only  one  page  left.  
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      
Public      
Very  low Low Moderate High Very  high N/A
For-­profit      
Social  enterprise      
Non-­profit/charitable      









The  questionnaire  is  nearly  finished.  Could  you  provide  us  with  some  information  about  your  organization?  
36. The educational background of our social finance portfolio managers is (check all that 
apply) 
37. The prior work experience of our social finance portfolio managers is (check all that 
apply) 
  






Social  service-­related  (ex.  MSW)
  





























38. To track our social finance investments we 
39. If you use a social finance measurement tool or tools, which do you use: 
  
40. Are there any other barriers to providing social finance investments you would like to 
note: 
  
Never Sometimes Often Always N/A
Mathematically  model  non-­
financial  returns








    
Use  different  risk  models  
than  for  for-­profit  
organizations
    
Monitor  their  community  
partner  
relationships/support
    
Compare  income  sources  to  
their  mission  focus
    
Use  Impact  Reporting  and  
Investment  Standards  (IRIS)
    
Other  (please  specify)  


